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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

Priority of payment of federal taxes to payment of taxpayer’s general credi
tors not given by statute but exists under common law. (Court decision—
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Johnson Shipyards Corporation.)
The issue, sale or transfer of certificates or shares of beneficial interest in an
operating or business trust is subject to tax. (T. D. 3620.)
Federal estate tax is not to be apportioned against the widow’s dower, or the
amount of the tax deducted from the gross estate, but under the laws of Ar
kansas the widow takes dower out of the gross estate without deduction for any
part of the federal estate tax, where there is other property sufficient to pay
the tax. (Court case: Thompson vs. Union and Mercantile Trust Co.)
The 25% reduction of 1923 taxes is computed on the total tax, line 31 of
1040 and not on the balance of tax, line 34. (I. T. 2057.)
No claim for abatement of any assessment made on or after June 2,1924, may
be accepted, unless assessment was made on account of jeopardy as provided
in sec. 274 (d) of act of 1924; the 1921 act governs with respect to filing claims
for abatement, if assessment made prior to June 2, 1924. (I. T. 2059.)
Discount on bonds issued by a corporation should be amortized over life of
bonds. (Mim. 3227.)
Appreciation of value of property does not necessarily accrue ratably over a
period of years and straight-line theory of appreciation held not to be ground
for suit for taxes by government. (Court case: U. S. vs. Boston and Montana
Cons. Copper and Silver Mining Co.)
Credit for foreign taxes should not be recomputed on the basis of the 25%
reduction in total taxes, though the 25% reduction of 1923 taxes is computed
on total tax as shown on line 31 of 1040. (I. T. 2062.)
Loss sustained on sale of real property on the instalment basis is deductible
only in the year of the sale. (I. T. 2063.)
Taxes assessed prior to enactment of revenue act of 1924 are to be computed,
collected and paid as if the revenue act of 1924 has not been enacted; those
assessed after said enactment are to be computed, either as deficiency, or as
interest, penalty or other addition to the tax, as if the 1924 act had not been
enacted, but they are to be collected and paid in the same manner and subject
to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of income taxes imposed
by the revenue act of 1924. (Mim. 3229.)
Excessive salary, where character and value of services rendered indicate it to
be excessive, held to be profits diverted or distributed in guise of salary and
therefore not deductible in full as an ordinary and necessary expense (court
decision in New York state tax case of People ex rd. H. Jaeckel & Sons, Inc.
vs. Gilchrist et al., state tax commission).
A payment received from a corporation of which the taxpayer was an em
ployee was held not to be a gift, but no information was forthcoming as to the
category under which it should be listed in gross income. This was the first
decision by the board of tax appeals in the case of John H. Parrett. The tax
payer’s case was denied for lack of evidence.
The profits of an investment company which are retained solely for the pur
pose of making other investments are presumed to be held for purpose of pre
venting imposition of surtax and will be subject to the additional tax of 50%
provided by the 1924 law. If earnings are distributed as dividends, they may
be returned to the company for investment without subjecting the corporation
to this tax. In case of all other corporations, such as manufacturing, trading
and other commercial corporations the tax does not apply unless gains or
profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business.
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TREASURY RULINGS

(T. D. 3612—July 1, 1924)
Income tax—Gross income—Corporations
Articles 294 and 541, regulations 45 (1920 edition), amended
Washington, D. C.
Articles 294 and 541 of regulations 45 (1920 edition) are hereby amended to
read as follows, and all prior regulations inconsistent therewith are revoked:
Art. 294. Premiums on business insurance.—Premiums paid by a taxpayer
on an insurance policy on the life of an officer, employee or other individual
financially interested in the taxpayer’s business, for the purpose of protecting
the taxpayer from loss in the event of the death of the officer or employee insured
are not deductible from the taxpayer's gross income. If, however, the taxpayer
is in no sense a beneficiary under such a policy, except as he may derive benefit
from the increased efficiency of the officer or employee, premiums so paid are
allowable deductions. See articles 33 and 105-108. In either case the pro
ceeds of such policies paid upon the death of the insured may be excluded from
gross income whether the beneficiary is an individual or a corporation. See
section 213 (b) (1) and articles 72 and $41.
Art. 541. Gross income.—The gross income of a corporation for the purpose
of the tax in general includes and excludes the same things as the gross income of
an individual. It embraces not only the operating revenues but also gains,
profits and income from all other sources, such as rentals, royalties, interest,
dividends from stock in other corporations and profits from the sale of capital
assets. The proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the in
sured to a corporate beneficiary are not to be included in its gross income. See
sections 213 and 215 of the statute and articles 31-88 and 294. But in the case
of life and mutual marine insurance companies and of foreign corporations
there are special provisions. See articles 548-550.
(T. D. 3614—July 7,1924)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court
1. Gross Estate—Transfer.
The value of transfers which operate in præsenti to create vested interests,
although such transfers are lawful and not intended to evade the tax laws, is
properly included in the decedent’s gross estate under the provisions of section
402 (c), revenue act of 1918, where such transfers were made in contemplation
of death or were intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death.
2. Same—Transfers to Take Effect at Death.
The intention to postpone possession or enjoyment may be disclosed by dec
larations of the donor, although such intention is not disclosed by the instru
ment of transfer.
3. Same—Trusts Intended to Take Effect at Death.
Where a donor, having a life expectancy of not more than 20 years, creates a
trust to accumulate the income of property for 30 years and to distribute the
corpus and accumulations at the end of that period to his children, declared at
the time the trust was created that, although he expected to be able to look
after those children and their interests for 15 or 20 years, he was looking beyond
that time and had in mind that they would come into possession after his death,
the trust is one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death within the meaning of section 402 (c), revenue act of 1918.

United States District Court, District of Nebraska, Omaha Division
Elizabeth F. Shukert and Isabel C. Shukert, executrices of the estate of Gustave E.
Shukert, plaintiffs, vs. Arthur B. Allen, collector of internal revenue, district of
Nebraska, defendant
(May 20, 1924)
The Court: There is motion now by plaintiff to instruct the jury to return
a verdict for the plaintiff, and there is, on the part of the government, a request
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to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
government claims the undisputed evidence shows a trust created by Gustave
E. Shukert in his lifetime which was intended to take effect in possession and
enjoyment after his death, and those are the two motions or requests to which
I will direct my attention.
The primary purpose undoubtedly of the federal inheritance tax law is to tax
inheritance, and lay a tax on the moneys that go from a decedent to his bene
ficiaries by will or descent. But that is not the whole purpose of the law. Such
laws as preceded the federal act in many of the states, and the experience under
them, had early demonstrated that where taxes, especially heavy taxes, were
to be laid upon inheritances, that many things were done to bring about the
devolution of property from an ancestor to children or kindred that did not
come squarely within the law of inheritance. That had been made very ap
parent, and those interested in such matters were very familiar with at least
several ways in which property was carried over from ancestor to children and
kindred by other means than the operation of the law of inheritance, so that
when the federal act came to be enacted it included at least some methods of
what I may call devolution or transfer of property that were not strictly within
the operation of the laws of inheritance. The first and most conspicuous matter
that was covered in the law was to provide a tax on gifts and transfers and deeds
and trusts that are made by a property owner in contemplation of death. Now,
such gifts, transfers, deeds and trusts, independent of that statute, did operate
to create vested interests in præsenti immediately upon the execution. They
were lawful, they were proper, they were well recognized, nothing wrong about
them; all of them, or mostly all of them, resulting from the natural affection of
families, and all upheld by the law, all eminently proper but so nearly related to
the operation of the law of inheritance that it was apparent that large sums
would be exempted from the statutes unless those means of transferring prop
erty were also mentioned and covered by the tax. So that was settled, that
gifts, even through in præsenti, though creating rights in præsenti, were subject
to tax if made in contemplation of death.
Now, the other provision is that property of the decedent shall be subject to
the tax if it appears that the decedent has at any time, whether before or after
February 24,1919, created a trust intended to take effect in possession or enjoy
ment after his death.
Now, in this case it stands undisputed that Mr. Shukert did out of, as appears
by the undisputed evidence, an unusual and extraordinary regard for the inter
ests of those who had a claim upon his bounty and care, his children, make this
trust in question and did create it, turn it over to the United States Trust Co.;
that the terms of the trust were such that Shukert himself entirely parted with
the title to his own property, and split the ownership of the property up into two
parts, creating both a legal and equitable property therein, and that the nature
of the trust was such that it operated in præsenti to confer both the legal and
equitable title upon the parties designated—no question about that. But the
time fixed, and that he had in mind for the beneficiaries of the trust to come into
possession or enjoyment thereof, was a period 30 years beyond the time when
he created the trust. It stands undisputed here that in the conversations he
had with those who were helping him create this trust at his direction, he
declared his purpose in a general way, sufficiently disclosed, or very clearly
disclosed and corroborated anyway by the terms of the trust itself, that in the
future, although he expected to be able to look after those children and their
interests 15 or 20 years, that he was looking beyond that time; that he had in
mind the possibility of their losing even the large fortune that he had and would
probably give them but that even so when they were approaching old age—the
daughter mentioned the words “old age”—that then in spite of what might
happen prior to that, that at that time they would come into possession of it
after his death.
Now, in the absence of an express provision of the statute, a tax on inherit
ances certainly would not Teach that conveyance, but it appears to me that the
statute has reached out after that identical trust and has used language that
describes it exactly. It declares taxable the property where he has created a
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trust intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment—and that means and
must mean, when you read the context and have in mind what the act is about,
that possession and enjoyment refers to the possession and enjoyment by the
beneficiaries. Now, this trust was one in which the possession and enjoyment
of it was to come to these beneficiaries long in the future, and, according to the
undisputed evidence here, and the clear evidence, beyond any time that he
expected to live himself. There is offered in evidence a table of expectancy
that would show his average expectancy, if he was a well man at the time, to
be some 15 or 16 years, 17 at the outside. He said himself to Mr. Cutler that
he might expect to live 15 or 20 years, according to the testimony of the plain
tiff, but the time when these beneficiaries were to come into the enjoyment and
possession of this particular trust was beyond that time, and beyond the time
of his death. Now, I understand clearly, I think, the argument that is made
here that this trust should be treated and considered as a gift in præsenti,
the deferred feature of it merely concerning the equitable title, but that the legal
title passes in præsenti. It is conceded that Shukert had a right to make an
absolute gift at that time of his property and it would not have been taxable
under the statute, but that is not what he did, and this statute was intended
clearly, as it seems to me, to reach out beyond the ordinary operation of the
law of inheritance and reach these transactions, proper transactions, lawful
transactions, no question of that kind involved that there is anything wrong
about it, and no trick about it, and no device or any intention to defeat any
tax manifested here, but that the express language of the statute reaches out
beyond the ordinary operation of the law of inheritance and reaches and extends
to these trusts which, at the time a man makes them, he has in mind and
intent, shall come in and take effect in possession and enjoyment after the time
when he expects to live. Now, that is the extent to which the statute, by its
clear and absolute terms goes, and, although it is the law that in the interpreta
tion of these tax statutes the law must be interpreted strictly so as not to enlarge
the claims of the government, the intendments favorable to the citizen rather
than to the government in cases of doubt or ambiguity or uncertainty—that
is the law. It is not the purpose of the court in interpreting these statutes to
stretch a point so as to make taxes payable except where they come within the
clear and specific letter and spirit of the law. It seems to me that that is where
this trust comes. It is a trust created by Mr. Shukert which he intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment long after he should have passed away;
after it might be that the large fortune which he had accumulated had been
lost through misfortune or extravagance or waste, or things that might happen
after that. His care went clear to the time when 30 years should have gone by.
His care for his children reached clear to that point and he intended that at
that time it should take effect. I don’t think the defeasance clause of the trust
agreement militates favorably to the plaintiff. It is made lawful by the pro
vision that if these beneficiaries should die or calamity should happen to them,
that then other things should be done. But the intent and whole purpose in
making up the trust was in the hope that they would live and at that time,
after his death, they would come into the possession and enjoyment of the
property.
Now, that being my view of it, I will overrule the motion of plaintiff and I
will sustain the request of the government to instruct the jury that the trust
in question was a trust created by Gustave E. Shukert in his lifetime and was
intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after his death, and
that, therefore, the verdict should be for the defendant.
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(Section 200.—Definitions)

Article 1523: Personal-service corporation.
REVENUE ACT OF 1921.

A majority of the stock of the M Company, a school, is owned by its
president. The remaining stock is owned by some of its teachers, the
other teachers owning no stock. The teachers are paid on the basis of a
percentage of profits, except the president, who receives a salary.
Held, that the M Company is not entitled to classification as a personal
service corporation.
The majority of the capital stock of the M School was owned during the
taxable year by its president, A. Substantially all of the remainder of the stock
was owned by about 18 per cent of the other teachers, all devoting substantially
their entire time to the work of giving instruction in connection with the school.
In addition to these teachers owning stock, other teachers, who owned no stock,
devoted substantially all of their time to the giving of instruction in taxpayer’s
school, and various other individuals, not stockholders, devoted a portion of
their time to such instruction. It is alleged that the stock-holding instructors
were the most skillful and important members of the teaching force and exer
cised, particularly A, general supervision over all of the instruction.
A, the president, received a substantial salary, and some salaries were paid
to other officers of the school. In general, however, the teachers, both those
owning stock and those not owning stock, were compensated by way of a per
centage of the fees paid for the instruction given. Thus for every dollar paid
by a pupil for instruction given by a particular teacher, that teacher received
two-thirds and the company received the remaining one-third.
Approximately x dollars was invested by the company in supplies, furniture
and fixtures.
In making its claim for personal service classification, the taxpayer empha
sized the great value and importance of the supervisory activities of the presi
dent and other stock-owning members of the school faculty. In addition, the
taxpayer lays great stress upon the method of compensating the teachers and
contends that under this method the taxpayer should not be considered as the
employer of the teachers in any ordinary sense, but on the contrary should be
considered as being employed by the teachers, on a commission basis, to obtain
work for them. In support of this theory, taxpayer has submitted a large
number of affidavits signed by the several teachers, all affidavits being in the
same form and reading as follows:
I hereby certify that the M Company School and its officers are work
ing for me in the securing of students and the supervision of my instruc
tion, and that I am not employed by the school but in fact the school is
working for me.

A reading of the entire record makes it sufficiently clear that the M Com
pany, an institution having a wide reputation and goodwill of its own, over
shadowing the individual reputation of the majority of its teachers, is for every
practical purpose employing teachers to give instruction in its name. It is
immaterial, for purposes of the present issue, that these teachers are paid on
the basis of a percentage of receipts rather than upon a straight salary basis,
and it is further immaterial that they are paid on the basis of a percentage of
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receipts from the instruction given by them rather than on the basis of a per
centage of total receipts. To a very substantial degree the corporation is ex
ploiting or trading in the professional services of its teachers, the great majority
of whom own no stock whatever, and for that reason is not entitled to personal
service classification. The fact that substantially all the income is derived
from personal service, as distinguished from the employment of capital, is
immaterial where so large a proportion of the personal service involved is
rendered by individuals who are not stockholders or owners.
The income referred to in section 200 of the statute, and which is required as a
prerequisite to personal service classification to be ascribable primarily to the
principal owners or stockholders, is the gross income, which in the present case
includes the entire amount paid by the students, all of which is paid to the
school and can be collected legally only by the school. It cannot fairly be
said that this income can be ascribed primarily to the principal owners or stock
holders. However, even if consideration be given merely to the net amount
retained by the school, 33⅓ per cent, the contention of taxpayer that this onethird should be segregated from the total and ascribed wholly to the personal
services of the stock-holding teachers is without merit. The entire fee paid
by any particular pupil is earned by the teacher giving the direct instruction,
by the teachers or officers exercising supervision, and by the officers conducting
the business and publicity part of the taxpayer’s activities, and it is impossible
to apportion various percentages of such fee among the several factors produc
ing it.
Although no further issue is suggested by the transmittal letter, taxpayer’s
representatives suggested at the hearing that if personal service classification
were denied, taxpayer’s income should be taxed under the provisions of section
303 of the revenue act of 1921. There is no basis for the application of the
section referred to in the taxpayer’s case. Taxpayer's income is not derived
from two sources, one of which involves the use of capital and the other of which
involves merely personal service by the stockholders. All of its income is
derived from the same source, which source is the compensation received from
----- instruction through a combination of the direct services of a very large
number of nonstock-holding teachers, the indirect supervisory services of the
stock-holding teachers, and the business initiative and activities of the tax
payer’s officers.
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is held that the protests be denied and the action
of the income-tax unit be sustained.
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